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The Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club: Naval Aviation in the Vietnam War
by Thomas McKelvey Cleaver
The Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club is a somewhat scattered account of the role of naval air power in the Vietnam War. The book is at its best when it lets the pilots speak, telling the story of hair-raising dogfights, bombing runs, and rescue missions in their own words. However, these are a collection of highlights, and don't cover the day-to-day facts of life on a carrier, or the existence of beings less exalted than pilots.
The technical analysis is better than the historical analysis. The Navy went into Vietnam with a solid collection of planes, a large and diverse flight deck that was much better than the underpowered ensign killers available even a few years earlier. But decent planes were hampered by abysmal missiles: both the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder had hit rates of less than 10%, with a large percentage of missiles simply inoperative due to harsh combat conditions wholly unlike the test range. The F-4 lacked an internal gun, and the Colt Mk 12 cannons on the F-8 were prone to jamming after hard turns.
From a strategic perspective, air interdiction simply couldn't stop North Vietnamese operations into South Vietnam. But a bad objective was furthered hampered by the contradictory limits of the Rolling Thunder campaign, which placed airfields and SAM sites as off limits least an errant bomb further escalate the war. Sortie rates became the sole reason of the self-licking ice cream cone of the air war.
A second thread that is worthwhile is the cultural difference between the Navy and Air Force. Air Force pilots famously flew 100 combat sorties, while Navy pilots flew until their tours ended, which meant Navy pilots routinely lapped their Air Force comrades in mission counts. With very mixed results against MiGs in Rolling Thunder, the Navy embarked on a program to train a cadre of pilots skilled in air-to-air combat, not simply interception. Graduates of the Top Gun program were responsible for much more favorable kill rates against MiGs in Linebacker, though skill couldn't help against the random chance of AAA fire, or the limits of airpower in a political war.
The technical analysis is better than the historical analysis. The Navy went into Vietnam with a solid collection of planes, a large and diverse flight deck that was much better than the underpowered ensign killers available even a few years earlier. But decent planes were hampered by abysmal missiles: both the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder had hit rates of less than 10%, with a large percentage of missiles simply inoperative due to harsh combat conditions wholly unlike the test range. The F-4 lacked an internal gun, and the Colt Mk 12 cannons on the F-8 were prone to jamming after hard turns.
From a strategic perspective, air interdiction simply couldn't stop North Vietnamese operations into South Vietnam. But a bad objective was furthered hampered by the contradictory limits of the Rolling Thunder campaign, which placed airfields and SAM sites as off limits least an errant bomb further escalate the war. Sortie rates became the sole reason of the self-licking ice cream cone of the air war.
A second thread that is worthwhile is the cultural difference between the Navy and Air Force. Air Force pilots famously flew 100 combat sorties, while Navy pilots flew until their tours ended, which meant Navy pilots routinely lapped their Air Force comrades in mission counts. With very mixed results against MiGs in Rolling Thunder, the Navy embarked on a program to train a cadre of pilots skilled in air-to-air combat, not simply interception. Graduates of the Top Gun program were responsible for much more favorable kill rates against MiGs in Linebacker, though skill couldn't help against the random chance of AAA fire, or the limits of airpower in a political war.