"As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

This quote, from Ricks' friend and colleague Lt. Col. Yingling, is at the heart of The Generals, which examines how army culture and personnel policies turned the winners of WW2 into the losers of Vietnam, and the tactically adept but strategically blind generals of the War on Terror. Ricks takes as his guidestone the policies and attitudes of General George Marshall, Chief of Staff during WW2. Marshall wanted optimistic, determined, energetic, resourceful team players, and he was ruthless in clearing out the failures to get them. Marshall and his top commanders, Eisenhower and Bradley in particular, sacked generals by the score. Relief was an ordinary part of being a general. By Vietnam, the situation had become completely reversed; Generals were almost never relieved for combat ineffectiveness, and the top brass were regarded as mendacious micro-managers. Post-Vietnam, the Army managed to rebuild its tactical leadership and integrity, but the generals promoted under the polices of General William DuPuy would lack strategic insight or the ability to work closely with their political counterparts.

The book itself consists of many biographical vignettes. Ricks knows how to write and has done his research: while I wasn't particularly surprised by the sections on WW2, Korea, and Vietnam, the post-Vietnam rebuilding was all new information for me. The sections on the War on Terror will be familiar to anybody who's read Ricks' Pulitzer-winning Fiasco.

However, this book is stuck at Lieutenant General (three stars-get it?), because of a little bad luck and some weak theory. The bad luck is General Petraeus, of whom Ricks is a major defender, who was brought down by scandal just after The Generals went to print. I can't find the article right now, but in the wake of the scandal I remember reading an insightful critique of Petraeus that argued that his true genius was managing the White House and the American public, and while an adept combat leader, his forte was more for PR than battle. It's bad luck that Ricks didn't have the time to consider this position, but the difference between combat effectiveness and the perception of combat effectiveness is at the heart of the problem of generalship that Ricks investigates. Major wars are infrequent generational affairs, how can good men be distinguished in peacetime?

The weak theory is a lack of something else to compare current Army policy to. Ricks makes a convincing case that because it is impossible to fire generals, it is impossible to improve their quality overall. However, the Navy relieves officers all the damn time. Are admirals better than generals? Hard to say, since the last fleet action was in WW2. Ultimately, the Army is a special organization: unlike business or the government, there's no way to bring in an experienced outsider to provide leadership. We should demand more from senior military leaders: more strategic insight, more integrity, more honest dialog with the White House and Congress. Unfortunately, in the absence of a 'super-general' like Marshall, and several decades of critical personnel policy, it seems unlikely that the corps of generals will be improved.