The War of Atonement is an uneven account of the Yom Kippur War. Herzog was a retired IDF general and Israeli politician. Around the time the book was first published in 1975 he was Israeli ambassador to the UN, and he would later serve as the (largely ceremonial) President of Israel. This book is at its worst, and paradoxically at its most interesting, when it argues for Israeli military reforms, and is otherwise a workman-like account of a war that had barely faded from the headlines.

The strategic situation heading into 1973 was one of instability. The Arab powers, particularly Egypt and Syria, were itching for a chance to reverse their catastrophic defeat in 1967. Israel knew that a second war was coming, but conventional wisdom was that it would be in 1975, when Egypt had rebuilt its medium bomber fleet. Israeli defense policy was based around taking the initial attack with outposts and what little strategic depth was available, and then counter-attacking with an armored force composed from reserves, which required between 46 and 72 hours to be organized. And this time, diplomatic realities preventing the kind of brilliant preemptive strike which began the Six Day War. The Arabs would launch the first strike.

The long War of Attrition in the lead-up to October 1973 served Egypt and Syria better than Israel. Israeli defenses were small and undermanned, its command structure weakened by rotation of senior officer, and its defense plans ambiguous. Meanwhile, Egypt and Syria trained for years on the initial attacks, every part of the plan rehearsed, while concentrating artillery and new anti-air missiles. While Israeli military intelligence did get wind of the attack with perhaps a days notice, they specified H-hour as 6:00 PM local time, 4 hours later than the actual H-hour of 2:00 PM. The initial Arab attacks met with great success, but Israeli defenders managed to inflict outsized losses in the fine defensive terrain of the Golan heights, and desperately mobilized forces finally turned back the Syrians. Meanwhile, in the south, Egypt crossed that Suez canal across its entire 110 mile length, but failed to move deeper into Sinai. A daring counter-crossing by the Israeli military drove deep into Egyptian territory, severing the Egyptian supply lines.

This book was published before the Camp David accords were finalized, so the diplomatic resolution is out of scope of the book. And while Israeli won, its military resolve was shaken. Herzog goes after Moshe Dayan for irresponsibility as defense minister in the lead up to the war, and defeatism in command during the war. Ariel Sharon is criticized for being unable to work as part of a unified command team, a charismatic asshole after glory. And the Israeli military as a whole assumed the ongoing supremacy of its armor and airpower, neglecting its infantry and artillery and the counters of new Soviet guided missiles in Arab hands, which caused excessive causalities.