The First Anglo-Afghan is one of the most astonishing military catastrophes in history. Dalrymple combines his compulsively readable style with a deep understanding of the period and translations of new Afghan sources to create a truly great book.


Remnants of an Army, depicting the William Brydon, "sole survivor" of the retreat from Kabul

British foreign policy in the late 1830s was oriented around protecting India, and using a combination of diplomacy, bribes, and military force to get Indian princes to support the policies of the British East India company. The long term threat to British security was Russian adventurism, and when Russian envoy Jan Prosper Witkiewicz, an exiled Polish noble working for the Tsar who also went by the name Vitkevich showed up in Afghanistan, the sahibs in London and Calcutta feared of a Russian-Persian-Afghan alliance which would encircle and dismember their possession in India.

Afghanistan was the weakest member of this potential alliance. In the first tragedy, the British had a man in Kabul, Alexander Burnes, and Burnes had good relationships with the King of Kabul, Dost Mohammed. However, Burnes was a low-born Scot, and his was overridden by more senior officials, particularly William Hay Macnaghten. Macnaghten's plan was to depost Dost Mohammed and install the previous king, Shaj Shuja, on the throne of Kabul. The initial invasion, by a large force of EIC infantry and roughly three times the number of fighters in camp followers was fiasco of ambush and marches without adequate water, saved only from the first disaster by the Battle of Ghazni, where Afghan defenders failed to brick up one gate of fortress which was seized by assault. After Ghazni, the English conquered Kabul, installed Shah Shuja, and eventually captured Dost Mohammed.

Having conquered Kabul, the British set out in an occupation that makes the 20th and 21st century ones look like brilliant strategic displays by comparison. Macnaghten alienated tribal elites repeatedly. He ignored advice from Burnes and Shah Shuja. He set up a cantonment that was indefensible, and then scattered supplies away from his troops. When the Afghans finally rose in rebellion, with the initiating spark being Burnes' womanizing habits, Macnaghten lead an insensate response that saw the British shot to pieces in their cantonment and all their supplies captured. While negotiating surrender with Dost Mohammed's son Akbar Khan, Macnaghten tried some moronic intrigues and was beheaded for his trouble. The remaining garrison had to fight their way to Jalalabad through miles of mountain passes in a freezing blizzard. The destruction of the English army was near total. Shah Shuja was assassinated while outside his fortress, trying to proclaim his royal authority. Dost Mohammed was released from captivity in India and returned to power.

The Afghans did not profit from their victory. The British organized a second Army of Retribution, which invaded the country, used superior firepower to drive off the politically disorganized locals, and torched everything within reach, including Kabul. Afghanistan was permanently wounded.

This is a great book. With the American Afghan War old enough to vote, history doesn't repeat but it rhymes. Hamid Karzai is oddly enough of the same subtribe as Shah Shuja. The Taliban has invoked the legacy of Dost Mohammed and standing up to the Ferengi invaders. And while the story has been told again and again from an English perspective, Dalrymple's brave research trip in 2010 and use of non-English sources show the war from all perspectives.