There is no denying that Liddell Hart is not only a brilliant tactician and an engaging historian, but he is also a wonderful writer. He has a dry sense of humor that can cut through the misery of the Great War while also highly the mind numbing grind of the war. It is hard to read the book without being crushed by the futility of the war, something that Liddell Hart actually accents by highlighting where the generals went wrong. The most painful battle to read, actually, is the 1914 Battle of the Marne, because he painfully highlights how the Allies could have made a breakthrough and won the war there and then, but they hesitated and created the gridlock warfare that WWI is known for.

Liddeill Hart also presents an interesting analysis of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles and he believes that Churchill was right, but the battle was botched because of ineffective leadership and lack of preparation. It is interesting, because I have only read about Gallipoli being a complete disaster. I have never really read someone trying to defend it.

Not only is the subject matter interesting, but the fact that the book was written in 1930 makes it a particularly fascinated piece of history. There is a hint of weariness in the writing and the epilogue almost broke my heart. There was a sense of great loss combined with a sense of acceptance that no one had really learned their lesson.

It is also interesting to note that Liddell Hart defends Churchill in his book-during a time where Churchill had not yet proven himself the lion of England. A particularly painful part of the book is the praise that Liddell Hart gives Petain. It only makes Petain's later actions even harder to deal with and understand.

I enjoyed reading this book and finding the beginning of ideas that would later be expanded upon in Liddell Hart's book: Strategy. In this book one can see his preference for the indirect method over the direct method (and one gets the impression that that preference came out of WWI) and his focus on the psychological aspect of warfare as well as his preference for the creation of complex weapons that bring about the end of the war with a high casualty list, but over a short term of actual warfare, thus saving lives (although it is interesting to compare that point of view with his point of view on dropping the bomb discussed in in Strategy).

While I truly enjoyed the book, I would have liked to see how seen more of an emphasis on the Eastern Front and the Middle East campaign. It seems strange to me to dedicate only a chapter and half to the Turks and to brush through the Eastern battles when the East determined the German's strategy for most of the war.

Overall it was a fantastic book about a horrible war. I would highly recommend it to anyone interested on the tactical and strategic side of WWI.