This is the stronger of Grau's books on the Soviet-Afghan War by far. Based on hundreds of interviews with former mujahideen in the mid 1990s, it is an invaluble account of how asymmetric warfare looks from the guerrilla's side.

When the mujahideen had it good, they had it very good indeed. Soviet convoy tactics were laughable, and skilled fighters were able to pick trucks off with ease, while avoiding the counterfire of armored escorts. Afghan Army outposts were basically supply depots, with guards that were cowardly and unwilling to fight. Conversely, when things went poorly, they went very poorly very quickly. Soviet airborne forces were a minority in battle, but they were supremely effective. Heavy artillery and aircraft pounded anyone exposed. The mujahideen logistics system and command structure never went beyond 'ramshackle'. This was both a weakness and a strength. While the mujahideen were unable to press an operational advantage, they were also impossible to decapitate. New leaders always rose to replace casualties. The Soviets, following the adage that the guerrilla swims like a fish in the sea of the people, attempted to drain the sea. Aerial bombardment and massive mining operations turned millions of Afghans into refugees, and lead directly to the Taliban, 9/11, the American invasion, and Afghanistan today.

The Other Side of the Mountain is focused solely on tactics, and probably should be read with a broader history of the region. But for what it does, it is the best book I've read!

Oh, and one more thing.