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The stereotype of the Viet Cong is a rice farmer by day, guerrilla fighter by night. But this stereotype is only partially true. The Viet Cong had three levels; local, regional, and main force fighters. The last is the focus of this group, large units of up to divisional scale. These units were commanded by officers who had spent years in North Vietnamese command schools, and were supported with modern weapons along the Ho Chi Minh trail.
As South Vietnam tottered under the series of coups between the fall of Diem and the rise of Thieu and Ky, the Vietnamese politburo saw an opportunity to strike at the regime and comprehensively defeat them. The introduction of American combat troops in 1965, initially the Marines and Airborne units, did not, in the estimation of Viet Cong commanders, alter the strategic balance. American soldiers might fight more skillfully and with greater resources than ARVN, but they could be defeated as well.
The Viet Cong tactics were encapsulated by the slogan that is the title of this book, "Grab by their belts to fight them." American airpower and artillery were overwhelming, but American soldiers could be killed in close combat. The Viet Cong would neutralize their opponents by closing to point blank range, inside the protective ring of firepower.
As Wilkins explores in a series of major engagements, these tactics produced claimed 'victories' for both sides, but the Viet Cong experienced dramatically higher casualties, often more than 10 times the number they inflicted on the Americans. No American unit larger than a company was crushed in a battle of annihilation. Airmobility and airpower made American units incredibly resilient in defense. Conversely, the overriding political need to minimize causalities meant that Americans would (soundly) avoid frontal assaults into prepared defensive positions, preferring to set a perimeter and let firepower do the killing. This meant that neither side was capable of annihilating the other.
Ultimately, the Viet Cong abandoned their motto. The proponents of 'big unit' war were unable to overwhelm the combined arms skill of the American military. The 1968 Tet Offensive was a political gamble, one which wrecked the Viet Cong as political force, but which also shattered American resolve. This book serves as a surprising vindication of General Westmoreland. He may not have been able to win the political war, but he won the military war that was his most pressing problem. Of course, rather than the defend the integrity of that tarnished figure (see Sorley's entertaining assassination), Wilkins ends on a more anodyne tribute to the fighting ability of the ordinary American soldier.
As South Vietnam tottered under the series of coups between the fall of Diem and the rise of Thieu and Ky, the Vietnamese politburo saw an opportunity to strike at the regime and comprehensively defeat them. The introduction of American combat troops in 1965, initially the Marines and Airborne units, did not, in the estimation of Viet Cong commanders, alter the strategic balance. American soldiers might fight more skillfully and with greater resources than ARVN, but they could be defeated as well.
The Viet Cong tactics were encapsulated by the slogan that is the title of this book, "Grab by their belts to fight them." American airpower and artillery were overwhelming, but American soldiers could be killed in close combat. The Viet Cong would neutralize their opponents by closing to point blank range, inside the protective ring of firepower.
As Wilkins explores in a series of major engagements, these tactics produced claimed 'victories' for both sides, but the Viet Cong experienced dramatically higher casualties, often more than 10 times the number they inflicted on the Americans. No American unit larger than a company was crushed in a battle of annihilation. Airmobility and airpower made American units incredibly resilient in defense. Conversely, the overriding political need to minimize causalities meant that Americans would (soundly) avoid frontal assaults into prepared defensive positions, preferring to set a perimeter and let firepower do the killing. This meant that neither side was capable of annihilating the other.
Ultimately, the Viet Cong abandoned their motto. The proponents of 'big unit' war were unable to overwhelm the combined arms skill of the American military. The 1968 Tet Offensive was a political gamble, one which wrecked the Viet Cong as political force, but which also shattered American resolve. This book serves as a surprising vindication of General Westmoreland. He may not have been able to win the political war, but he won the military war that was his most pressing problem. Of course, rather than the defend the integrity of that tarnished figure (see Sorley's entertaining assassination), Wilkins ends on a more anodyne tribute to the fighting ability of the ordinary American soldier.