The definitive account of America's slow slide into the Vietnam War, McMaster explores how the Kennedy administration disabled the formal Joint Chief's advising process in favor of ad hoc committees of civilian advisers, cutting the military out of the decision-making loop. This insularity, coupled with President Johnson's duplicity and Secretary McNamara's arrogance lead America into war without a real decision on "why", or "how much." The consensus demanded by Johnson to foster his domestic agenda concealed a lack of strategic thought, a desire to avoid making any decision until it was too late. McNamara's strategy of "graduated pressure" was fundamentally flawed, and the outmaneuvered JCS were unable to force the issue. But by buying into the administrations lies, in the 1965 Congressional hearings on the war, the JCS fundamentally abrogated their duty to the American people and Constitution.

The topic of America's entry into Vietnam is complex, McMaster's account is readable, but frequently repetitive, and occasionally more opinionated than history warrants. On the other hand, it beats going to the primary source material.