I've read quite a few WW2 histories lately, but not a comprehensive account of the Pacific theater. Toll's 3 volume, 1500 page epic seemed like a reasonable place to start. This book focuses on Pearl Harbor to Midway, with detours into the historical origins of major figures, the admirals Nimitz, King, Halsey, and Yamamoto. As expected, Toll is an incredibly engaging writer (I read this book at a gallop, long past a sensible bedtime), bringing the drama and history of the moment alive. He is the dean of naval historians, evocatively painting the scene while avoid the excesses of purple prose that Hornfischer sometimes falls victim to.

Midway to Pearl Harbor is such a well-trodden period that there's little new here, though I did appreciate having the timelines all in one place, which helped me understand the interplay of Japan's massive early victories, probing raids by American carriers in the Battle of the Coral sea and the Doolittle Raid, and the decisive victory at Midway. And the drama of early carrier fighting comes through. These were eggshells with sledgehammers. Interception and anti-air fire were not yet well developed sciences, and battles were tense games of blind man's bluff across hundreds of miles, with tense timing of strikes.

I enjoyed the framing, which was around Mahan's theory of sea power and the importance of concentration of force. Japan embraced Mahan wholeheartedly, using his theories to defeat Russia in 1906. The Kido Butai, the six striking carriers that hit Pearl Harbor and supported the wave of conquests, was a vindication of the theory of concentrating capital ships. At Midway, Yamamoto disregarded Mahan, scattering his forces and objectives while attempting strategic deception (rendered futile by American codebreakers), while Nimitz aimed solely to sink the Japanese carriers. While luck played a large role in the American victory, it was Nimitz's preparation that turned opportunity into victory.

Yet, the narrative choice was to jump almost directly from Mahan and 1900 to Pearl Harbor. I can see the reason why, the attack was a strategic surprise, a shocking blow to America. Yet it also came at the end of escalating tensions between the US and Japan, and decades of treaty-constrained warship design. Toll is good of a historian not to mention this, and while I can follow his reasoning, the effect seems forced. Still, an exceptional history. I'm excited for volumes 2 and 3.