There are few topics more contentious than the use of airpower in the Vietnam War. Tilford attempts a balanced, academic dismantling of two major airpower myths, that Rolling Thunder could have been successful if Johnson and McNamara untied commanders hands and let them use maximum force, and that the Linebacker II Christmas Bombings brought North Vietnam to its knees. Vietnam was in many ways an air war: airpower was the first component in, the last to leave, and accounted for 50% of the cost of the war to America. Understanding airpower is key to understanding the war, but Tilford's efforts don't quite match up to his thesis.

The strategic analysis is quite good, as Tilford discusses the evolution of airpower theory from Douhet and Mitchell through the 1960s, the adoption as an article of faith by airforce brass that strategic bomber strikes against 'vital centers' could destroy the foe's ability and will to wage war, and how it became solidified in a nuclear-centric heavy bomber force. This doctrine might have been applicable to WW2 Germany and Japan, but the agrarian economy of North Vietnam had no vital centers, and the people were totally committed to the war. Rather, from 65-68 airpower proved ineffective because Hanoi was willing to endure any sane attack, short of nuclear weapons, and in 72 the Christmas bombings were irrelevant because the recalcitrant party were the South Vietnamese, who recognized a bad deal when they saw one. But I think acceptance of the strategic analysis is tied more to your agreement with the Revisionist school of Vietnam War historians (personally, I disagree with the Revisionists entirely. Vastly increased American firepower and commitment would not have changed the final outcome)

What I wanted from this book was more of an operational/tactical critique of the air war. In the introduction, Tilford talks about his experiences as a briefing officer, being unable to use the word 'retreat' to describe ARVN behavior during the Lam Son 719 fiasco, and being punished for 'taking the commander's planes away' to do close-air support. For the key interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh trail, truck kill counts had no basis in reality. When the Air Force finally shot at real truck on a range stateside, the found a "destroyed" truck hit by a 40mm Bofors shell had easily repairable damage, and a "damaged" near-miss from the same shell might not even puncture tires.

Those are fascinating moments, but that's all there is. I've heard that the command structure for airpower in Vietnam was a mess: CINCPAC, 7th Airforce, 13th Airforce, ground commanders with on call fire support, etc. Unity of command is a basic precept of military operations, and this book doesn't adequately describe disunity in Vietnam. Likewise, while Crosswinds describes three campaigns in detail (Rolling Thunder, Linebacker, and Commando Hunt), close air support for troops in South Vietnam is barely covered at all, with just an aside that it took 110,000 tons of bombs to kill 10,000 PAVN soldiers at Khe Sanh.

The final chapter is a recapitulation of the success of airpower in Desert Storm, where stealth bombers and precision guided weapons devastated Saddam's tank army in the open field, paving the way for a stunning limited victory. This chapter feels tacked on, and at odds with the rest of the book.

Aligning the destructive force of airpower with the objectives of modern limited wars is definitely a challenge, but all I can say after reading this book is that we definitely didn't do it in Vietnam.