A Bitter Peace is the definitive book on the diplomatic side of the political war, and the lengthy process of negotiating the Paris Peace Accords. Practically a day by day account, Asselin compares how the negotiating positions of the various side shifted over the course of years-long negotiations. It's not exactly light reading, but it's an important look at how diplomacy functioned.

For Nixon and Kissinger, the goal was "peace with honor", a withdrawal mandated by the turn of American public opinion that would also return the POWs and not lead to the immediate collapse of South Vietnam. For Le Duc Tho and North Vietnamese government, there were memories of 1954 and the betrayal at Geneva, where the victory of Dien Bien Phu was wiped away by third party negotiators leading to partition and another 20 years of war. And in South Vietnam, President Thieu was acutely aware of the weakness of his government, and the need to hold the line against Communist infiltration.

In general terms negotiations can only succeed if the parties believe it is a better option than the alternatives, and the overall tempo of the negotiations were driven by North Vietnamese strength on the battlefield. The 1972 Easter Offensive saw initial gains that got bogged down by the overwhelming airpower of Operation Linebacker. Devastation on the home front encouraged Tho to be more flexible in his terms over language. This was also true in the Christmas Bombings, which helped convince Thieu that the treaty was the best alternative available to South Vietnam.

While the final Paris Accords were less than what North Vietnam hoped for (Theiu's resignation, open elections, and likely political reunification on Communist terms), it was also far from a guarantee of South Vietnam's territorial integrity, and indeed the county would survive less than 18 more months.