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Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal
by James D. Hornfischer
The Marines get all the credit for Guadalcanal, but the campaign shaped the United States Navy as well. The Navy lost almost 3 sailors for every infantryman killed ashore, with 24 ships sunk in the waters that would come to be known as Ironbottom Sound. The grinding campaign in the seas around the Solomon Island taught the Navy painful lessons, and eventually wore down the highly elite Imperial Japanese Navy.
Hornfischer is too much of a historian to pass judgement, but one of the key themes is the incompetence of American commanders and their inability to press their advantages. Most of the naval battles were night actions; sudden knife fights in close quarters by cruisers and destroyers. While both forces were operating at the very limits of their logistics, the Japanese had trained for night fighting, and had effective doctrine that prioritized their excellent Long Lance torpedoes and individual aggressiveness. Conversely, few American officers understood how to best use the absolute technological advantage of rader-guided gunnery. There were errors that would be funny if they weren't so tragic, like using "R for Roger" as code to open fire, just like Roger Over Victor from Airplane. Patrolling ships were set to Condition 2, a false alertness that had sailors scrabbling to their duty stations in the critical first minutes of battle. There were similar failures of supply, intelligence, and command all through the fleet, and American sailors paid the price.
As with Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, Hornfischer's greatest talent is humanizing the men of the fleet: sailors and junior officers who did their duty even as their ships turned to flaming charnel houses. However, with 82 ships and 7 major battles, there's less time to get to know the participants, and the bigger picture erodes some of his talents compared to his other book. I also wished that there was more of the Japanese perspective, as with Shattered Sword, but I understand why this book would be mostly American. It's very very good military history, but not quite great.
Hornfischer is too much of a historian to pass judgement, but one of the key themes is the incompetence of American commanders and their inability to press their advantages. Most of the naval battles were night actions; sudden knife fights in close quarters by cruisers and destroyers. While both forces were operating at the very limits of their logistics, the Japanese had trained for night fighting, and had effective doctrine that prioritized their excellent Long Lance torpedoes and individual aggressiveness. Conversely, few American officers understood how to best use the absolute technological advantage of rader-guided gunnery. There were errors that would be funny if they weren't so tragic, like using "R for Roger" as code to open fire, just like Roger Over Victor from Airplane. Patrolling ships were set to Condition 2, a false alertness that had sailors scrabbling to their duty stations in the critical first minutes of battle. There were similar failures of supply, intelligence, and command all through the fleet, and American sailors paid the price.
As with Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, Hornfischer's greatest talent is humanizing the men of the fleet: sailors and junior officers who did their duty even as their ships turned to flaming charnel houses. However, with 82 ships and 7 major battles, there's less time to get to know the participants, and the bigger picture erodes some of his talents compared to his other book. I also wished that there was more of the Japanese perspective, as with Shattered Sword, but I understand why this book would be mostly American. It's very very good military history, but not quite great.