The Conquering Tide covers the middle of the war in the Pacific, from Guadalcanal to the capture of Guam. It is, if anything, stronger than the first book in the series. Toll moves confidently around the theater, capturing battles and personalities from the highest levels of command to the ordinary sailors and marines.

Three exceptional sections elevate the book: First, an early study of the British coastwatchers in the Solomon Islands, who's radio reports of Japanese movements gave the embattled Cactus Air Force the tactical edge is needed to survive. Second, the legendary first patrol of submarine commander 'Mush' Morton. American submarines sank more Japanese shipping over the course of the war than existed on December 7, 1941, strangling the Japanese Empire. And third, the epilogue, a study of the increasingly desperate censorship on the Japanese home front, as the civilians read propagandized reports of 'strategic victories' closer to the Home Islands, and prepared for the coming gotterdammerung of the strategic bombing campaign.

As Yamamoto predicted prior to Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would run wild for six months, and then the increasing power of American industry would tell. This book is the story of the building of those muscles. The Guadalcanal campaign was a desperate measure for both sides, at the very fringes of their respective logistic capabilities. The remote airfield threatened sea lanes between the United States and Australia. Marines seized the airfield in an uncontested landing, but the constant IJN night attacks meant that American resupply efforts were scanty. Similarly, American airpower meant that any IJN supply run had to be completed in one night from their distant base at Rabaul. Sharp cruiser and destroyer actions sunk many American ships in the waters of Ironbottom Sound, but Japanese troops on the island were reduced to starvation rations of 500 calories per day. The aviators at Henderson field had the defender's advantage, and months of attrition warfare finished off the professional core of naval aviators who'd attacked Pearl Harbor. Japanese air power would only pose a threat through the desperate measure of kamikaze attacks in the future. In what would be characteristic of the war, while America pilots and marines suffered and died, their commanders recognized that well-supplied troops fought better, and that pilots had a useful combat career of four weeks before combat fatigue rendered them ineffective. Japan believed that the warrior samurai spirit could triumph over any difficulty, and that victory or death were the only options. Exhausted pilots became easy prey, starving troops died in frontal attacks, and the feud-ridden Japanese command structure couldn't adapt to changing circumstances.

The second major story is the new technologies pioneered by the American navy. The Essex class fleet carrier, the F6F Hellcat fighter, and a host of landing ships upended prewar ideas of strategy. Japan had planned for a mutually reinforcing system of bases in outlying island chains. The massive 5th Fleet had the logistic capabilities to move anywhere in theater, obliterate land-based airpower, and put Marines ashore on defend beaches. Island-hopping strategy bypassed Japanese strong points, making defensive preparations moot and leaving elite troops stranded to slowly starve.

Toll's history doesn't break much new ground, and with so much to cover, it must perforce leave some details out. Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno is a similarly sized book on the naval actions around Guadalcanal alone. But for a synoptic view of the Pacific Theater, nothing comes close.