Lessons in Disaster is a post-mortem look at the pivotal moments of the Vietnam War as viewed through the eyes of National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. "Mac" was one of the hawks, who publicly argued for escalating the Vietnam War, but he held private doubts about the possibility of success. This book originated in a collaboration between the author and Bundy on his memoirs, which was cut short by Bundy's death in 1996. Based on the historical record, scribbled 'fragments' for that book, and conversations with Bundy, Goldstein wrote a different book about the key decisions to intervene in Vietnam, and the relationship between Bundy and the presidents he served.

The primary argument that Goldstein advances is one that defends the reputation of Kennedy at the expense of Johnson. The picture of Kennedy that emerges is one of skepticism towards the military bureaucracy, a man who learned hard lessons in the Bay of Bigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis, who knew that starting a war was easier than finishing it, and that there was little of strategic interest in Vietnam. Kennedy was willing to deploy special forces and adviser/training forces, but not to commit ground combat troops.

By contrast, Johnson was desperate to save political face, and unable to make the hard choice to abandon Vietnam. A dyed-in-the-wool creature of the legislature, Johnson treated his staff like Senators he was whipping for a key vote, not a source of ideas, options, and plans. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution shored up Johnson's right flank during the 1964 election, rather than acting towards a strategic end. The decision to escalate was based on a desire to get General Westmoreland onboard, and then to negotiate the lowest number of troops that would keep Westmoreland's support, not any clear strategic goals. This is a solid story, but better told in H.R. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty.

The problem is that where we might get some unique insight into Bundy's character and role in the great drama of the Vietnam War, the book becomes maddeningly vague. American Rasputin draws a clear line between Rostow's modernization theory and faith in the efficacy of airpower. McNamara's memoirs describe a flawed process of analysis and roads not taken. The Best and The Brightest has a compelling argument about the fatal arrogance and political cowardice of the Washington establishment. All of those books are superior to Lessons in Disaster.

National Security Adviser is a strange role, with little formal power but a great deal of potential access to the President, and power through that channel. Bundy was one of the brightest of Kennedy's advisers, an academic wunderkind who became the youngest Dean of Harvard (fascinatingly, as Dean he was continually interviewed by David Halberstam for the Harvard Crimson, who would go on to cover the Vietnam War and excoriate Bundy for his role in it.) But relatively little of that man comes through. In fact, Bundy was on vacation for key moments, like the Vance telegram that set in motion the coup against Diem. The post-facto disapproval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the introduction of ground troops are weakly contrasted against active approval for escalating the war at all decision points. And I wish we had more about the SIGMA II-64 wargame that correctly predicted how the war would go in 1964, and at which Bundy was present. Not a bad book, per se, but one almost entirely redundant.