The sequel to Forczyk's Schwerpunkt, Red Steamroller is much the same but for the rest of the war. This book is tilted heavily towards 1943, which seems to get three times as much space as 1944. 1945 is compressed into "and then Stalin ordered Zhukov to take Berlin before reasonable preparations could be made, leading to heavy casualties."

As expected, Forczyk blends impeccable historical data with a tanker's view of operations. His premise is that the Soviets managed to develop a successful combined arms team through 1943, while heavy casualties deprived the Nazis of their initial advantage. The heavy cats (Tigers, Panthers, and a host of tank destroyers) were mechanical failures that limited the fighting ability of the Wehrmacht. Meanwhile, Soviet tanker training was horrifically poor, with limited real-world driving or gunnery practice, let alone tactics. Soviet tankers were not trained how to boresight their guns, a vital step in making sure you hit what you aimed at.

However, I'm not sure that Forczyk's argument about the decline of the panzer division really holds up. Yes, the Nazis never really had the material resources to reconstitute the forces that did the Blitzkrieg, and yeah, the mechanical reliability of the Tiger and Panther was abysmal, but even given the Nazi penchant for inflating statistics, he cites dozens of encounters where a handful of Nazi heavy tanks in a defensive position inflicted massive casualties. Tanks may be strong on the armored offense, but they seem even more powerful on the 'shoot-and-scoot' defense. Having failed to capture Moscow in the initial offensive, I'm not sure that there was a chance of a Nazi victory in the East. A more skillful defense would have increased casualties.

I'm glad I read Forczyk's books, but these are really for the specialist.